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DIRECTORATE OF
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
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C South Vietnam: The most significant action on 26-27 May took place in the northernmost provinces where stepped-up Communist shelling attacks were reported for the second day in a row.

Communist forces in this region could play a much greater role in any upcoming summer offensive than they did in the spring campaign in late February and early March. Elements of the North Vietnamese 325th Division and several independent regiments have recently become more active in the Demilitarized Zone area. The initial impact of these units' movement into I Corps was felt last week when the 29th Regiment made a determined stand during the heavy fighting on Ap Bia Mountain in western Thua Thien Province.

* * * *

A Communist document captured recently in Saigon provides a slightly different scenario for the enemy's summer offensive than those previously noted. The document claims that the summer campaign will consist of a series of short "concentrated stages" of attacks. It says that the attacks of 12-13 May were the first such stage and that successive phases will come around the first of June and the first of July.

Most documents [redacted] which have previously described this year's summer campaign have simply asserted that the offensive would be "larger" than the spring offensive and would come in June or shortly thereafter. A summer offensive featuring a series of intense but brief surges of shelling and ground attacks, as indicated in the latest enemy directive, seems quite plausible. The Communists may well believe that such a campaign would adequately demonstrate their continued potency, keep allied losses at a high level, frustrate allied programs and operations, and support the enemy's negotiating position. [redacted]

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Sudan: The new leftist military regime which seized power in a bloodless coup on 25 May is still attempting to consolidate its hold on the country.

The primary source of authority in the new regime is the ten-member Revolutionary Command Council headed by Colonel (now Major General) Jafar Muhammad Numayri, who has had Communist connections. The only civilian on the council is the new prime minister, Babikar Awadallah, who has had close Communist and Egyptian associations. [REDACTED]

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25X1 [REDACTED] Major Faruk Uthman Hamadnallah, who holds the key post of minister of interior. The other council members are obscure field-grade army officers whose political orientation is as yet unknown.

Twelve of the 21 members of the new cabinet are suspected or known members of the Sudanese Communist Party. Seven of the 12 are either present or former members of the party central committee. The other members of the cabinet belong to the leftist, urban-based Democratic Unionist Party, [REDACTED]

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The principal opposition to the new regime is provided by members of the conservative Umma Party. The estimated two million Ansars, who constitute the major support of the party, have in the past been a major obstacle to leftist ambitions. An estimated 30-40 percent of the armed forces are Ansars.

All of the officers appointed to key commands in the army following the coup are reportedly pro-West political moderates. These officers may have been appointed only to reassure the army that a

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radical purge was not about to occur; they may be gradually transferred and replaced by more radical officers.

Prime Minister Awadallah, speaking to the foreign representatives in Khartoum, has attempted to portray the new regime as nonaligned and socialist, and has stated that the chief foreign policy theme of the new government will be "Arabism" with full support for the Palestinian cause. Although Awadallah reportedly reassured Western ambassadors that the new government has not moved into the Communist camp, he has also said that the government would establish closer relations with the Soviet bloc, and on 27 May announced a decision to establish diplomatic relations with East Germany. [redacted]

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Ceylon: Prime Minister Senanayake is increasingly concerned over possible outbreaks of communal violence.

The prime minister has tried to moderate the traditional animosities between the minority Tamils, primarily based in the north, and the majority Sinhalese in the south. Their religious and ethnic differences provide opportunities for exploitation by the left.

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[Redacted]

The prime minister has reason to be especially wary of possible moves to stimulate unrest by Nagalingam Shanmugathasan, leader of a revolutionary faction of the Ceylon Communist Party/Peking. In the past Shanmugathasan has called for open revolution by the Tamils and has urged them to demonstrate violently against caste discrimination. [Redacted]

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Ceylon has experienced encouraging economic growth in the past two years, but a revival of communal disturbances could set back economic progress and prevent Senanayake from concentrating on unsolved economic problems--in particular widespread unemployment. Failure to act on these problems could be reflected in a loss of government support at the polls. [Redacted]

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West Germany: Chancellor Kiesinger, during last week's visit to Japan, took a hard line on the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. Kiesinger told Premier Sato that his government would certainly not sign before the September national elections. Kiesinger evidently received little support for his holdout position. Rather, Sato implied that Japan would be concerned if the Germans were not a treaty participant. [redacted]

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Peru: The Ministry of Mines and Energy is considering a Rumanian offer to build an oil refinery in southern Peru. One of President Velasco's extreme leftist advisers, German Tito Gutierrez, who is second in command in the ministry, has argued strongly for acceptance, but others in the ministry want to open the bidding to other countries that have shown interest in the project. No decision has been made, but leaders of the military government have expressed their desire to have the refinery completed as soon as possible to facilitate the direct supply of fuel to military units in the south. [redacted]

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[redacted]

(continued)

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Congo (Kinshasa): The army is concerned over rumors that former mercenary leader Jean Schramme is in Angola recruiting for a new invasion of Katanga sometime after Independence Day, 30 June. Although reports of recruiting are probably false, the army lacks the resources to evaluate information and has accepted them as fact. Consequently, individual units near the Congo-Angola border may overreact and begin a campaign of intimidation against the local citizens.

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